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ABSTRACT 
  Since the mid-1950s, a sea change in public education has taken 
place. Public education—a policy concern traditionally reserved to 
the states—has become a core concern of the federal government. 
This Note surveys three of the federal government’s most significant 
appropriations of power: the enactment of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in 1965; the creation of the 
Department of Education in 1980; and the passage of the No Child 
Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), the most recent, and easily most 
expansive, iteration of the ESEA. This Note also considers the 
manner in which the Supreme Court has facilitated federal control 
over education, despite the Court’s refusal to recognize a formal right 
to education. Finally, this Note argues that the federal government’s 
incursion into the realm of public education has established an 
implicit right to education that has rendered San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez, the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision that denied the 
existence of a fundamental right to education, obsolete. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The era of big Government is over,” President Clinton declared 
in his 1996 State of the Union Address.1 “[B]ig Government does not 
have all the answers.”2 This sentiment, though perhaps surprising 
coming from a Democratic president, reflects a widely acknowledged 
rhetorical shift in American politics in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries: a transition away from the parlance of Great 
Society liberalism in the 1960s and toward aphorisms advocating 
smaller-government conservatism.3 Yet the political discourse 
surrounding one core issue of social policy has followed a 
diametrically opposite trajectory. Since the 1960s, the executive and 
legislative branches have discussed in increasingly grandiose terms 
the appropriate role of the federal government with respect to public 
education. This rhetoric, moreover, has been translated into practice, 
as the two branches have appropriated progressively more significant 
aspects of the states’ traditional role in public education. 
Since the first public schools opened in the 1840s,4 education has 
been regarded as a quintessentially local responsibility.5 The 
Constitution does not mention education; thus, under the Tenth 
 
 1. President William Jefferson Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on 
the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 79, 79 (Jan. 23, 1996). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See GARETH DAVIES, SEE GOVERNMENT GROW: EDUCATION POLITICS FROM 
JOHNSON TO REAGAN 1 (2007) (“Historians commonly conceive of American politics since the 
1960s as a sustained reaction against Great Society liberalism. There is plenty of evidence to 
support the notion of a rightward shift, be it in the form of election results, poll data (declining 
numbers of Americans identifying with ‘liberalism,’ levels of trust in government), growing 
inequalities of wealth and income, rates of incarceration, the proliferation of conservative think 
tanks and lobby groups, the decline of organized labor, the composition of the Supreme Court, 
the growth of evangelical Protestantism, welfare reform, or the declaration by Democratic 
president Bill Clinton that ‘the era of big government is over.’ The list could easily be 
extended.” (quoting Clinton, supra note 1, at 79)). 
 4. Michael W. Kirst, Turning Points: A History of American School Governance, in 
WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?: THE TANGLED WEB OF SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 14, 17 
(Noel Epstein ed., 2004). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(“[I]t is well established that education is a traditional concern of the States.”); Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974) (“No single tradition in public education is more deeply 
rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought 
essential . . . to quality of the educational process.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 
(1972) (“Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.” (emphasis 
added)); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“By and large, public education in our 
Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments.” (emphasis added)). 
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Amendment,6 the power to control public education has traditionally 
been reserved to the states.7 In fact, until the 1950s, the federal 
government’s involvement in public education was virtually 
nonexistent.8 
Local control over education, however, has been steadily eroding 
since the Supreme Court’s landmark Brown v. Board of Education9 
decision in 1954.10 Local school boards and superintendents are 
increasingly being forced to surrender their authority to the federal 
government, leading some observers to call the remaining vestiges of 
local control “endangered species.”11 Whereas local education 
agencies used to be the sole arbiters of education policy, they are now 
regularly relegated to “implementing other people’s goals and 
priorities.”12 In conjunction with this decrease in state and local 
autonomy, the federal government’s involvement in public education 
has ballooned.13 As of 2011, Congress and the Department of 
Education were funding more than sixty education programs,14 and by 
2003, federal spending on education had grown to represent 
 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
 7. See Kirst, supra note 4, at 16 (“In the early days of the republic, Americans distrusted 
distant government and wanted important decisions made close to home, especially regarding 
education. Thus the U.S. Constitution made no mention of schools, leaving control of education 
to the states, and states then delegated a great deal of power to local school districts. . . . [T]he 
doctrine of local control of public schools has occupied a special place in American political 
ideology.”); Regina R. Umpstead, The No Child Left Behind Act: Is It an Unfunded Mandate or 
a Promotion of Federal Educational Ideals?, 37 J.L. & EDUC. 193, 196 (2008) (“State and local 
governments have traditionally been responsible for providing education in the United States. 
Education is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution and is, therefore, reserved to the states 
through the Tenth Amendment.”). 
 8. Patrick McGuinn & Frederick Hess, Freedom from Ignorance?: The Great Society and 
the Evolution of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, in THE GREAT SOCIETY 
AND THE HIGH TIDE OF LIBERALISM 289, 290 (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 
2005). 
 9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 10. See James E. Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal 
Boundaries of Education Governance, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?, supra note 4, at 42, 43 
(“State and federal officials have been taking more and more control away from local school 
districts for several decades.”). 
 11. Kirst, supra note 4, at 14. 
 12. Noel Epstein, Introduction to WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?, supra note 4, at 1, 3. 
 13. Ryan, supra note 10, at 44. 
 14. Id. 
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approximately 9 percent of the total revenue available for public 
schools, up from 2.9 percent in 1950.15 
Curiously, although the federal government has continued to 
encroach upon the states’ traditional role in education, both Congress 
and the Supreme Court have opted not to establish any formal 
federal right to education. Whereas all fifty states enshrine a right to 
education in their state constitutions,16 Congress has declined to 
advance an analogous amendment to the federal Constitution.17 
Similarly, beginning with its decision in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez,18 the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
refused to recognize education as a fundamental right.19 
Numerous legal scholars have zealously protested against 
Rodriguez and its successors, calling on the Court to overturn that 
line of precedent and affirmatively establish a federal right to 
education.20 This Note contends that this wave of discontent is 
 
 15. THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF 
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2010, at 260 tbl.180 (2011), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/
2011015.pdf. 
 16. Amy L. Moore, When Enough Isn’t Enough: Qualitative and Quantitative Assessments 
of Adequate Education in State Constitutions by State Supreme Courts, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 
560 (2010); Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The Full Realization of Our Rights: The Right 
to Health in State Constitutions, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1051 (2010). 
 17. Congressman Jesse Jackson, Jr., proposed a resolution in 2005 that called for a 
constitutional amendment declaring that “[a]ll persons shall enjoy the right to a public 
education of equal high quality.” H.R.J. Res. 29, 109th Cong. (2005). And in his 1944 State of 
the Union Address, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt urged Congress to “implement[ an] 
economic bill of rights” that included “[t]he right to a good education.” President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Message to the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), reprinted in 1944–
45 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32, 41–42 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1950). 
 18. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 19. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (noting that the 
Court has never “accepted the proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right,’ . . . which 
should trigger strict scrutiny when government interferes with an individual’s access to it” 
(quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982))); 
Papasan, 478 U.S. at 285–86 (“As Rodriguez and Plyler [v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982),] indicate, 
this Court has not yet definitively settled the questions whether a minimally adequate education 
is a fundamental right and whether a statute alleged to discriminatorily infringe that right should 
be accorded heightened equal protection review. Nor does this case require resolution of these 
issues.”). 
 20. Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revisited: Constitutional Theory and School Finance, 32 
GA. L. REV. 475, 476 (1998); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of 
Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 111–13, 123 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court has 
been “tragically wrong” in failing to recognize a fundamental right to education); Goodwin Liu, 
Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (2006) (contending that 
the Fourteenth Amendment “authorizes and obligates Congress to ensure a meaningful floor of 
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superfluous—not because Rodriguez was properly decided, but 
because actions of Congress and the executive branch in the sixty 
years following the decision have established an implicit federal right 
to education that is equivalent—and perhaps even superior—to any 
right the Court might have established.21 
Part I of this Note tracks the expanding scope of congressional 
authority over education by examining three of Congress’s most 
substantial power grabs: the enactment of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA);22 the creation of the 
Department of Education; and the passage of the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB),23 the most recent version of the ESEA. 
Part II then examines the Supreme Court’s complicity in the federal 
government’s appropriations of power. Next, Part III introduces 
Rodriguez and the canon of cases that have considered a federal right 
to education. Finally, Part IV argues that Congress’s incursion into 
public education has rendered the Court’s Rodriguez decision 
obsolete. By enacting NCLB and empowering the Department of 
Education to enforce it, Congress has implicitly established a federal 
right to education, diminishing the need for the Court to recognize 
such a right. 
I.  CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION OF POWER OVER EDUCATION 
The road to an implicit federal right to education was paved 
gradually over the second half of the twentieth century, as Congress 
expanded the scope of the federal government’s authority over 
education. 
 
educational opportunity”); Ian Millhiser, Note, What Happens to a Dream Deferred?: Cleansing 
the Taint of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 55 DUKE L.J. 405, 406–08 
(2005) (offering a “progressive constitutional framework that includes a fundamental, 
affirmative right to an adequate education” and calling upon the courts to implement such a 
framework). But see Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right To Learn: The Uncertain 
Allure of Making a Federal Case out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 783 (2008) (urging 
advocates not to pursue a federal fundamental right to education in the existing political and 
judicial climate). 
 21. Admittedly, some advocates of a federal right to education will be dissatisfied with an 
implicit federal right to education, as opposed to a constitutional amendment. For further 
discussion of this criticism, see infra Part IV.A. 
 22. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 23. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
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For most of the nation’s history, the federal legislature limited 
itself to supporting states’ efforts to educate the public, playing only a 
negligible role in elementary and secondary education.24 The notion 
that local control of education was “a desirable end in itself [wa]s a 
virtually uncontested position, put forth by commentators, courts, and 
government officials alike.”25 Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, 
however, the political landscape began to shift, as the civil rights 
movement and President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty gained 
traction.26 Motivated by a desire to improve educational equity and to 
provide educational opportunities for disadvantaged students, 
Congress embarked upon an unprecedented foray into public 
education.27 This Part traces three of Congress’s most significant 
incursions into the states’ traditional educational sphere. These three 
legislative actions exemplify the federal legislature’s appropriation of 
control over public education from the states and illustrate how 
education has transitioned from being “perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments”28 to being a top priority of 
the federal government as well. 
A. Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
The passage of the ESEA in 1965 “represented a sea-change in 
federal involvement in a state function.”29 For the first time, the 
federal government committed general federal aid to education, a 
move many conservatives regarded as an encroachment upon the 
 
 24. Patrick McGuinn, The National Schoolmarm: No Child Left Behind and the New 
Educational Federalism, 35 PUBLIUS 41, 48 (2005). 
 25. Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 905 (2006). 
 26. Cf. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 25 (“If any one legislative measure during Johnson’s first 
year bore his distinctive stamp, then it was the War on Poverty. . . . [A]nd education was 
presented as being the decisive weapon that would allow the antipoverty war to be won.”). See 
generally ELIZABETH H. DEBRAY, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY & EDUCATION: FEDERAL POLICY 
DURING THE CLINTON AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS 5–6 (2006) (describing the emergence of 
“[p]overty as an issue on Capitol Hill” and the relationship between the passage of the ESEA 
and President Johnson’s “larger legislative and political strategy”). 
 27. See McGuinn & Hess, supra note 8, at 289 (“[The ESEA] marked the first major 
incursion of the federal government into K–12 education policy . . . . At the heart of the ESEA 
was a powerful equity rationale for federal government activism to promote greater economic 
and social opportunity.”). 
 28. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 29. David Karen, No Child Left Behind?: Sociology Ignored!, in NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 
AND THE REDUCTION OF THE ACHIEVEMENT GAP: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
FEDERAL EDUCATIONAL POLICY 13, 14–15 (Alan R. Sadovnik et al. eds., 2008). 
BOYCE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2012  10:42 PM 
2012] THE OBSOLESCENCE OF RODRIGUEZ 1031 
“last remaining bastion of traditional American federalism.”30 In the 
century preceding the enactment of the ESEA, Congress had 
considered providing unrestricted general aid to public schools thirty-
six times.31 All thirty-six times, Congress had declined to do so.32 
Congressional resistance broke down, however, following 
President Johnson’s election in 1964.33 The Johnson administration 
contended that state and local governments were not making 
adequate strides toward alleviating poverty in America, and President 
Johnson forcefully urged Congress to intervene.34 “With education,” 
Johnson explained, “instead of being condemned to poverty and 
idleness, young Americans can learn the skills to find a job and 
provide for a family.”35 President Johnson encouraged Congress to 
take a new approach to federal aid: rather than offering schools 
completely unrestricted grants, President Johnson asked Congress to 
provide grants specifically geared toward educating children who had 
grown up in impoverished households.36 
Conservative members of Congress railed against President 
Johnson’s progressive initiative.37 As Professors Patrick McGuinn and 
 
 30. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
 31. Kirst, supra note 4, at 22. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See DEBRAY, supra note 26, at 6 (“[T]he passage of the ESEA signified the end of a 
lengthy congressional stalemate in approving federal aid to schools.”); JULIE ROY JEFFREY, 
EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN OF THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT OF 1965, at 72 (1978) (“Upon 
coming to the presidency in 1963, Johnson had unequivocally committed himself to the passage 
of federal aid to education.”). 
 34. DEBRAY, supra note 26, at 6–7. Various members of Congress echoed the president’s 
call to arms. See, e.g., JOHN BRADEMAS, THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION: CONFLICT AND 
CONSENSUS ON CAPITOL HILL 76–77 (1987) (“Many of us in Congress . . . perceived that there 
were indeed genuine needs—in housing, health, and education—to which state and city 
governments were simply not responding. It was this inattention by state and local political 
leaders, therefore, that prompted us at the federal level to say, ‘We’re going to do something 
about such problems.’ And we did.”). 
 35. President Lyndon B. Johnson, The President’s News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 364, 
365 (Apr. 1, 1965). 
 36. Kirst, supra note 4, at 23; see also DEBRAY, supra note 26, at 6 (“Prior legislative 
histories concur that a central reason for [the ESEA’s] passage was that its proponents 
advanced it as a ‘special purpose’ bill for the neediest students. It was not to be general aid, 
opposed for decades out of a fear of federal control and the inability to settle religious and 
racial conflicts.”). 
 37. See, e.g., JEFFREY, supra note 33, at 80–81 (describing Representative Charles 
Goodell’s opposition to the bill); see also HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE UNCERTAIN TRIUMPH: 
FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY IN THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS, at xv (1984) (“[T]o 
propose federal ‘intrusion’ into the sanctity of the state-local-private preserve of education was 
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Frederick Hess explain, the ESEA marked “the first major incursion 
of the federal government into K–12 education policy,” and many 
senators and representatives were wary of President Johnson’s 
proposed “era of federal involvement in school reform.”38 For years, 
antistatist conservatives, determined to thwart federal intrusion into 
an area they regarded as an exclusive realm of the states, had formed 
majorities to block the passage of any general-aid legislation.39 
Opponents of the ESEA argued that the federal government had no 
constitutional prerogative to get involved in public education and that 
passing the law would be an affront to federalism that would 
inevitably lead to federal control of public schools.40 
Proponents of the bill disagreed. According to President 
Johnson, the ESEA would serve only to “strengthen State and local 
agencies.”41 U.S. Commissioner for Education Francis Keppel 
reiterated the president’s message, “express[ing] ‘sympathy’ 
for . . . superintendents . . . but . . . indicat[ing] that [their] fear of 
Federal control was not well founded.”42 Commissioner Keppel 
stressed the fact that states would retain the authority to distribute 
and regulate the federal funds they received as they saw fit.43 The 
ESEA would, according to the Johnson administration, simply form a 
 
to stride boldly into a uniquely dangerous political mine field that pitted Democrat against 
Republican, liberal against conservative, . . . federal power against states rights, white against 
black, and rich constituency against poor in mercurial cross-cutting alliances.”). 
 38. McGuinn & Hess, supra note 8, at 289. For many members of Congress, the ESEA also 
raised troubling Establishment Clause concerns, as it provided government funds to parochial 
schools. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 33–35, 42–43; see also Charles Mohr, President Signs 
Education Bill at His Old School, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1965, at 1 (“[The ESEA] is the first time 
Federal funds have been authorized to indirectly assist private, church schools. And it is the first 
major, general aid to elementary education to get through Congress, where there has been 
acrimonious disagreement on the church-state issue.”). 
 39. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 10. 
 40. EUGENE EIDENBERG & ROY D. MOREY, AN ACT OF CONGRESS: THE LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESS AND THE MAKING OF EDUCATION POLICY 11 (1969); see also DAVIES, supra note 3, at 
35 (explaining that some Republicans and Southern Democrats worried that the ESEA 
“represented a sharp break with traditional models of federalism”). 
 41. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks in Johnson City, Tex., upon Signing the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Bill, 1 PUB. PAPERS 412, 413 (Apr. 11, 1965) (emphasis 
added). 
 42. Leonard Buder, School Aid by U.S. Is Raising Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1965, at 45 
(quoting Comm’r Keppel). 
 43. Id.; see also DAVID K. COHEN & SUSAN L. MOFFITT, THE ORDEAL OF EQUALITY: DID 
FEDERAL REGULATION FIX THE SCHOOLS? 3 (2009) (“Though the formula [established in the 
ESEA] decided how much money states and localities would get, it decided nothing about how 
that money would be spent—save that it was to be spent on the education of children from poor 
families.”). 
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new cooperative partnership between the states and the federal 
government that would collectively transform public education.44 
President Johnson’s most persuasive talking point was that the 
ESEA would provide federal funds to almost every congressional 
district in the country.45 Title I of the ESEA pledged over $1 billion in 
“financial assistance . . . to local educational agencies serving areas 
with concentrations of children from low-income families.”46 To 
allocate the funds, Congress instituted a formula that guaranteed 
“annual grant[s] equal to half the cost borne by the state in educating 
each child from a family with an income of $2,000 a year or less.”47 
The ESEA also appropriated funds to help schools purchase 
textbooks and other educational materials.48 Ultimately, President 
Johnson’s promises of massive federal grants for state coffers, 
combined with the assurance that prescribing programs and projects 
would be “left to the discretion and judgment of the local public 
educational agencies,”49 were too enticing for legislators to pass up. 
The ESEA flew through Congress astonishingly quickly for such a 
significant piece of legislation, passing in just eighty-nine days.50 
Following the enactment of the ESEA, the concept of federal aid 
for education rapidly won broad acceptance. Although four-fifths of 
the Republican representatives and 44 percent of the Republican 
senators had voted against the ESEA when it originally passed in 
1965,51 by 1974, when the ESEA came up for renewal for the first 
time, “conservative opposition had all but disappeared.”52 Within a 
year, federal education spending had almost tripled—from 
 
 44. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: “Toward Full 
Educational Opportunity,” 1 PUB. PAPERS 25, 26 (Jan. 12, 1965) (“In all that we do, we mean to 
strengthen our state and community education systems. Federal assistance does not mean 
federal control . . . .”). 
 45. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 35. 
 46. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, sec. 2, § 201, 79 
Stat. 27, 27; see also Mohr, supra note 38 (“President Johnson signed today the $1.3 billion aid-
to-education bill . . . .”). 
 47. Mohr, supra note 38; see also Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 sec. 2, 
§ 203, 79 Stat. at 28–30 (describing the grant formula). 
 48. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 § 201, 79 Stat. at 36. See generally 
JEFFREY, supra note 33, at 76–77 (explaining the various titles of the ESEA). 
 49. S. REP. NO. 89-146, at 9 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1446, 1454. 
 50. See DAVIES, supra note 3, at 37 (noting the relative ease with which Congress passed 
the ESEA). 
 51. Id. at 1; 111 CONG. REC. 7718 (1965) (listing the fourteen Republican senators who 
voted against the ESEA—44 percent of the thirty-two Republican senators who voted). 
 52. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 2. 
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$890,685,000 in 1965 to $2,408,209,000 in 196653—and states and local 
school districts had quickly come to rely on the ESEA’s annual 
federal funding to keep their schools operating.54 In light of the 
“difficult fiscal circumstances of the 1970s,” states—along with the 
men and women representing their constituencies in Congress—
proved willing to overlook their federalism concerns in exchange for 
these critical federal dollars.55 
As federal aid for education continued to gain popularity during 
the Nixon and Ford administrations, the idea of a federal role in 
education became firmly embedded in the fabric of American 
politics.56 This ideological shift would later prove critical as the federal 
government tried to garner support for its second major expansion 
into the field of education: the creation of a federal Department of 
Education. 
B. Creation of the Department of Education 
No congressional action has illuminated the shift toward greater 
federal involvement in education more starkly than the creation of a 
cabinet-level Department of Education in 1978. As Professor David 
Breneman and journalist Noel Epstein wrote in a contemporaneous 
op-ed, “Establishing a Cabinet-level department . . . [broke] with the 
long tradition of a limited federal involvement in education and of 
virtually no federal responsibility for schools . . . .”57 For decades, 
education had been buried in the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW), an agency whose staff was small and budget was 
even smaller.58 The creation of the federal Department of Education 
 
 53. STEPHEN K. BAILEY & EDITH K. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION 
ADMINISTERS A LAW, at vii–viii (1968). 
 54. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 2. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. (“[T]he growing popularity of federal aid to education during the Nixon-Ford 
years exemplifies a basic reality of American politics . . . : there are powerful inertial forces in 
American political life, and they can work to preserve the liberal legacies of periods of reform 
ferment in less propitious times just as much as they constrain innovation. Initially bold 
departures in policy become embedded in the fabric of American politics, acquire a 
constituency back home and supporting lobbies in Washington, and become, if not impregnable, 
then at least firmly resistant to assault.”). 
 57. David W. Breneman & Noel Epstein, Op-Ed., Uncle Sam’s Growing Clout in the 
Classroom, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1978, at D1. 
 58. When the U.S. Office of Education moved from the Department of the Interior to 
HEW in 1950, it had a staff of three hundred and a budget of $40 million. Kirst, supra note 4, at 
22–23. As of January 2012, the Department of Education had a staff of more than 4200 and 
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forever “transformed the way education is governed in the United 
States” and officially recognized, for the first time, that education is 
an important federal responsibility.59 
Beginning in the early 1900s, members of Congress had 
introduced more than 130 bills seeking to create a federal 
Department of Education.60 For half a century, these bills had lacked 
the support of the executive branch and had failed to gain momentum 
with Democrats.61 Thus, much to the chagrin of education reformers, 
the bills had languished and stalled year after year without ever being 
considered in committee.62 
Abraham Ribicoff’s ascension to the Senate breathed new life 
into the quest for a federal department dedicated exclusively to 
education.63 Beginning in 1965, Senator Ribicoff, a former secretary of 
HEW, faithfully introduced a “Department of Education Act” each 
year.64 Ribicoff made little progress until 1974, when the little-known 
governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, decided to seek the presidency.65 
One of Carter’s key campaign promises was his pledge to transform 
the “complicated and confused and overlapping and wasteful federal 
government bureaucracy” into “an efficient, economical, purposeful, 
and manageable government.”66 Carter “opposed the proliferation of 
executive agencies and . . . promised to cut their number from 1,900 
to 200.”67 And with his plans to consolidate the twenty agencies that 
were administering education programs into one central department, 
Carter aimed to streamline the executive branch and eliminate 
 
spent over $68.6 billion annually. The Executive Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/our-government/executive-branch (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). 
 59. Breneman & Epstein, supra note 57. 
 60. ROBERT V. HEFFERNAN, CABINETMAKERS: STORY OF THE THREE-YEAR BATTLE TO 
ESTABLISH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 40 (2001). 
 61. See id. (explaining that Jimmy Carter was the first “modern American President” to 
commit to establishing a federal Department of Education). 
 62. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 231; see also HEFFERNAN, supra note 60, at 40 (“Congress had 
not even taken one [of the bills to create the Department of Education] from the file drawer 
since the 1950s.”). 
 63. Cf. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 361 n.44 (“Ribicoff . . . had long argued that [HEW] was 
unmanageable and had been trying to break it up ever since he had joined the Senate.”). 
 64. S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 14 (1978). 
 65. See HEFFERNAN, supra note 60, at 21 (declaring that once President Carter entered the 
presidential race, “[t]eacher power . . . blossomed into a mature political force”). 
 66. Jimmy Carter, Our Nation’s Past and Future, Address Accepting the Presidential 
Nomination at the Democratic National Convention in New York City (July 15, 1976) 
(transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25953). 
 67. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 229. 
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bureaucratic inefficiencies at HEW.68 In March 1977, just two months 
after President Carter took office, Senator Ribicoff commenced 
hearings on his annual bill to create a Department of Education.69 
This time, however, he enjoyed the backing of more than fifty 
senators70 as well as the support of the administration.71 
Senator Ribicoff and his cosponsors garnered support for the bill 
by emphasizing the government’s fragmented approach to education72 
and the need for a federal commitment to public schools.73 The Senate 
report for Ribicoff’s bill argued that education needed a cabinet-level 
secretary if it was going to receive any meaningful attention: “[T]he 
American people need a highly visible, responsible, high-level 
Federal official who can be held accountable for the successes or 
failures of educational programs and policies . . . . Education needs a 
strong advocate in Washington to speak for its needs and to assist in 
solving its problems.”74 According to the report, “problems in 
education [had] reached near-crisis proportions,” and the best way to 
“aid” the “troubled state of education” was to create a federal 
department.75 
 
 68. Id.; DEANNA L. MICHAEL, JIMMY CARTER AS EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKER: EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY AND EFFICIENCY 88 (2008). President Carter’s pledge to create a cabinet-level 
Department of Education was also influenced by Carter’s sense of indebtedness to the National 
Education Association (NEA). DAVIES, supra note 3, at 222. The NEA’s decision to endorse 
Carter and the “massive support from teachers” that the endorsement subsequently guaranteed 
were widely acknowledged to have been “crucial to [Carter’s] winning [the] election.” Id. at 228 
(quoting Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s campaign manager) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 69. S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 14. 
 70. Id. 
 71. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 233. 
 72. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 32,216 (1978) (statement of Sen. Charles H. Percy) (“[T]he 
Federal education effort is greatly fragmented, resulting in an uncoordinated approach to 
solving the many problems facing our Nation’s schools.”). 
 73. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 7 (“The [Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs] 
believes the improvement of the Federal education effort must be a major priority. But 
education will never be a priority as long as it is smothered in layers of bureaucracy, fragmented 
across several Federal agencies, and diminished by a severe lack of attention in our National 
Government.”); 124 CONG. REC. 32,215–16 (1978) (statement of Sen. Charles H. Percy) (“This 
is a question of national priorities. I think it is about time we really state that education must be 
one of our highest priorities. It is the duty and the responsibility of . . . the U.S. Senate . . . to 
determine whether or not the structure [of the government] assigns a high enough priority to 
education when it is buried so deep in a department that spends 95 percent or 94 percent of its 
resources in some other areas.”). 
 74. S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 11. 
 75. Id. at 7–8. 
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Senator Ribicoff’s bill, Senate Bill 991,76 faced zealous opposition 
from senators who believed the creation of a Department of 
Education would usurp state control and expand the role of the 
federal government in public education. Senator Harrison Schmitt, 
for instance, delivered the following remarks: 
[Our] locally controlled educational system is under attack by those 
who believe . . . that there is a national elite which can better govern 
the people than can the people themselves. . . . 
  . . . . 
  Education in the United States has traditionally been the 
responsibility of local and State authorities. By its silence on 
education, the Constitution specifically leaves control to the 
individual States. . . . 
  . . . . 
  There is no question that the United States must have a deep 
commitment to education; our future depends on that commitment. 
The commitment, however, must be met through local and State 
control of education . . . . [T]here is no reason to believe, nor is there 
any historical evidence to prove, that the quality of education will be 
improved by the increased Federal control that a new Department 
of Education would encourage.77 
Those senators who supported the bill, however, fought back 
against Senator Schmitt and other like-minded members of Congress, 
insisting that a cabinet-level Department of Education would not 
diminish local control over public schools.78 In fact, the original 
 
 76. Department of Education Organization Act, S. 991, 95th Cong. (1977). 
 77. 124 CONG. REC. 32,182–83 (1978) (statement of Sen. Harrison Schmitt); see also id. at 
32,183 (“The people of the United States want less government and not more. They want less 
governmental control and not more. They want less regulations and not more. Yet, the creation 
of this new department will result in more government, more governmental control, and more 
regulations in education than we have ever seen before.”); id. at 32,196 (“I would say that the 
lack of mention of education in the Constitution, along with the reservation of powers to the 
States, strongly suggests to this Senator that there was never any intent by the Founding Fathers 
nor any intent subsequently, through recent decades, to have the Federal Government involved 
in any significant way in the policymaking, in the administration, or other activities of the 
educational system of this country.”). 
 78. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 161 (additional views of Sens. John C. Danforth & 
William V. Roth, Jr.) (“The establishment of a Cabinet-level Department of Education is not in 
any way intended or expected to result in expanded Federal involvement in education issues 
that are the primary responsibility of States and localities. Rather, the new Department is 
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Senate bill was revised to include a finding reiterating the argument 
that the role of the federal government in education was not actually 
expanding.79 According to the sponsoring senators, the federal 
government would continue to leave questions of policy and 
curriculum to state and local authorities.80 The Department of 
Education would simply serve as an “assistant” to the states and 
would use its resources to “supplement and complement” traditional 
educational authorities.81 
This battle over the constitutional significance of a federal 
Department of Education did not end even after President Carter 
signed Senate Bill 991 into law on October 17, 1979.82 For nearly 
twenty years, the creation of the Department of Education continued 
to generate conflict and draw ire from those who rejected such a large 
federal role in education.83 The promised abolition of the Department 
of Education was a central feature of several Republican presidential 
candidates’ platforms during the 1980s and 1990s.84 In his first State of 
 
intended to strengthen the capacity of States, localities, and private institutions to meet their 
educational needs.”). 
 79. See Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 103(a), 93 Stat. 
668, 670 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3403(a) (2006)) (“It is the intention of the Congress in 
the establishment of the Department to protect the rights of State and local 
governments . . . and to strengthen and improve the control of such governments and 
institutions over their own educational programs and policies. The establishment of the 
Department of Education shall not increase the authority of the Federal Government over 
education or diminish the responsibility for education which is reserved to the States and the 
local school systems and other instrumentalities of the States.” (emphasis added)); 124 CONG. 
REC. 32,211 (1978) (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff) (“[T]he Senators . . . had the findings 
and purposes of the original bill changed to assure that local control would be preeminent, and 
this new department would really supplement, complement, and assist local governments.”). 
 80. See S. REP. NO. 95-1078, at 11 (“But effective management does not mean ‘more 
control.’ The responsibility for education policy and curriculum will remain at State, local and 
private levels.”). 
 81. Id. at 8. 
 82. Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the Notion of 
Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 5 (2010). 
 83. See McGuinn, supra note 24, at 54 (noting that not until “the late 1990s” did 
“congressional Republicans drop[] their proposals to eliminate the Department of Education 
and to cut federal education spending”). 
 84. Veronique de Rugy & Marie Gryphon, Elimination Lost: What Happened to 
Abolishing the Department of Education?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 11, 2004, 9:14 AM), http://
www.nationalreview.com/articles/209477/elimination-lost/veronique-de-rugy. Several candidates 
seeking the Republican presidential nomination in 2012 have revived this trend, pledging to 
abolish or drastically shrink the Department of Education should they be elected. See Trip 
Gabriel, G.O.P. Anti-Federalism Aims at Education, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A28 (“[T]he 
quest to sharply shrink government that all the Republican candidates embrace . . . has brought 
a sweeping anti-federalism to the fore on education . . . .”). Despite these candidates’ promises, 
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the Union Address,85 President Reagan renewed an earlier campaign 
promise to dismantle the Department of Education,86 and Senator and 
presidential candidate Bob Dole declared that he intended to “cut out 
the Department of Education” while on the campaign trail in 1996.87 
The Department of Education also faced regular organized attacks 
from members of Congress in the twenty years after its creation.88 In 
January 1995, for instance, several members of Congress “declared 
their intent to dissolve the [Department of Education] and turn 
programs over to the states.”89 
Each of these resistance efforts ultimately fizzled,90 and by the 
late 1990s, Republicans had been forced to abandon their quest to 
 
the elimination of the Department of Education seems unlikely. See infra notes 217–18 and 
accompanying text. 
 85. President Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting 
on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 72 (Jan. 26, 1982). 
 86. REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1980 (1980), 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844 (“[T]he Republican Party 
supports deregulation by the federal government of public education, and encourages the 
elimination of the federal Department of Education.”); MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, FROM A NATION 
AT RISK TO NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND: NATIONAL EDUCATION GOALS AND THE CREATION OF 
FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY 15 (2009); see also DAVIES, supra note 3, at 245 (“[Reagan] 
believed that [the creation of the Department of Education] was a dangerous development and 
pledged to dismantle it, as part of a broader effort to return responsibility for the schools back 
to the states.”). 
 87. The Department of Education, PBS NEWSHOUR (Fall 1996), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/backgrounders/department_of_education.html (quoting Sen. Dole) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). The official GOP party platform similarly declared: 
  Our formula is as simple as it is sweeping: the federal government has no 
constitutional authority to be involved in school curricula or to control jobs in the 
work place. That is why we will abolish the Department of Education, end federal 
meddling in our schools, and promote family choice at all levels of learning. 
REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1996 (1996), available 
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848#axzz1cZohA9Fc. 
 88. See de Rugy & Gryphon, supra note 84 (“While the Republican congresses of the mid-
1990s are most famous for their efforts to eliminate the department, their goal was not a new 
one. Conservatives had talked about eliminating the department since its creation by President 
Carter.”). 
 89. DEBRAY, supra note 26, at 1; see also id. (“The great federal experiment in education is 
over. It is failed. It is time to move on.” (quoting Rep. Joe Scarborough) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 90. President Reagan’s reversal was particularly notable. An outspoken critic of the 
Department of Education, Reagan fought bitterly against the expanding federal role in 
education. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 246–47. At the end of Reagan’s first term, however, the 
president’s most significant accomplishment in education was his commission of NAT’L COMM’N 
ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL 
REFORM (1983), an official report that assessed the quality of American schools and compared 
them with those in other advanced nations, id. at 1. This report’s somber diagnosis—that the 
country was “at risk” because of “disturbing inadequacies” in the American educational 
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eliminate the Department of Education.91 A Nation at Risk,92 the 
official report on education commissioned by President Reagan,93 
helped “stimulate a national conversation about educational 
excellence” that “revolutionize[d] the federal role” in education.94 
Responding to voters, who ranked education at the top of their 
agendas during the 1996 presidential election, Republicans were 
forced to “put forward their own vision for federal educational 
leadership.”95 By 2000, conservatives had abandoned their states’-
rights and small-government principles in the realm of public 
education, as political considerations ultimately superseded the 
party’s federalist concerns.96 
This dramatic shift paved the way for President George W. Bush 
to introduce the “most significant overhaul and expansion of the 
federal role in education since [the ESEA]”: No Child Left Behind.97 
C. No Child Left Behind 
In their landmark 1968 book chronicling the enactment of the 
ESEA, Professors Stephen Bailey and Edith Mosher ominously 
foretell the “profound consequences” the ESEA will have on 
“American education and . . . the American Federal system 
generally.”98 By enacting the ESEA, they contend, Congress has used 
its spending power to “plunge[] the Federal government smack into 
the middle of the total educational enterprise.”99 Professors Bailey 
and Mosher note, “The fact is that once the [Spending Clause] is 
interpreted liberally, it is impossible to set limits to the extent of 
 
process, id. at 5, 18—catapulted education to the front of the American consciousness, see 
VINOVSKIS, supra note 86, at 17 (“A Nation at Risk hit a very responsive chord . . . .”). As the 
public called for national education reform, President Reagan’s vision of a diminished federal 
role in education quickly eroded; in his second inaugural address, the president made no 
mention of abolishing the Department of Education. See President Ronald Reagan, Inaugural 
Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 55 (Jan. 21, 1985). 
 91. McGuinn, supra note 24, at 54. 
 92. NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., supra note 90. 
 93. See supra note 90. 
 94. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 275. 
 95. McGuinn, supra note 24, at 54. 
 96. Id. at 55–56. A decade later, several candidates for the 2012 Republican presidential 
nomination renewed the debate, see supra note 84, and in January 2011, Senator Rand Paul 
introduced a bill that would have defunded almost all of the Department of Education’s 
programs, see Cut Federal Spending Act of 2011, S. 162, 112th Cong. § 7 (2011). 
 97. McGuinn, supra note 24, at 41. 
 98. BAILEY & MOSHER, supra note 53, at vii. 
 99. Id. at 3. 
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Federal involvement in public education.”100 Bailey and Mosher scoff 
at the notion that Congress is actually limited by its “constitutional 
authority.”101 Unless Congress chooses to exercise self-restraint, they 
warn, the federal government will continue to “move[] massively into 
areas of educational support formerly deemed the exclusive province 
of State and local governments.”102 
Although the words of Professors Bailey and Mosher perhaps 
seemed hyperbolic in the 1960s, they seem clairvoyant in the twenty-
first century. In the four decades following the enactment of the 
ESEA, Congress indeed tested constitutional limits and used its 
spending power to infringe further upon state and local governments’ 
traditional authority.103 NCLB, Congress’s most recent 
reauthorization of the ESEA, provides a new paradigm for the 
balance of power in education that is remarkably consistent with 
Bailey and Mosher’s predictions. “[A]n unprecedented extension of 
federal authority over states and local schools,” NCLB completely 
obfuscates the traditional dividing line between federal and state 
roles in education.104 Since its enactment in 2002, local control has 
become a virtual anachronism, and Congress’s ability to direct 
education policy and reform seems limitless.105 
In a clear break from the small-government conservatism of the 
Reagan era, NCLB was enacted under President George W. Bush.106 
 
 100. Id. at viii. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See supra notes 4–15 and accompanying text. Using its spending power, Congress has 
passed numerous landmark pieces of legislation—for example, Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 235, 373–75 (codified as amended at 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1685 (2006)); section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-
112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006)); the Equal 
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514 (codified as amended at 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1758 (2006)); and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)). 
Umpstead, supra note 7, at 197–98. 
 104. Andrew Rudalevige, The Politics of No Child Left Behind, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2003, at 
63, 63. 
 105. See infra notes 116–37 and accompanying text. 
 106. See DAVIES, supra note 3, at 5 (“The fact that so prescriptive a measure was sponsored 
by President George W. Bush, a Republican, and enacted by a GOP-dominated Congress 
illustrated anew that conservatives had traveled a long way since the enactment of ESEA, 
decisively abandoning the small government faith of their forefathers.”); David E. Sanger, Bush 
Pushes Ambitious Education Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at A1 (“[T]he Bush 
plan . . . demonstrated how much the Republican Party’s position has changed to conform to 
Mr. Bush’s initiative. In 1994, one of his party’s rallying cries was the elimination of the 
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Unlike the Republicans of the 1980s and 1990s, who had lobbied 
tirelessly for federal withdrawal from the field of public education, 
President Bush advocated a strong role for the federal government.107 
“Change will not come by disdaining or dismantling the Federal role 
of education,” Bush argued.108 “[E]ducational excellence for all is a 
national issue . . . .”109 
Yet President Bush insisted that an increased federal role would 
not equate to decreased local control or upset the federal balance.110 
“[E]ducation is primarily a state and local responsibility,” Bush 
explained.111 “I believe strongly in local control of schools.”112 
According to President Bush, NCLB would offer states 
“unprecedented freedom and flexibility” in exchange for increased 
accountability.113 States would be required to measure student 
performance more rigorously,114 but in exchange, the president 
pledged that his administration would “pass power back from 
Washington, D.C., to [the] states.”115 
Although President Bush’s stated intentions may have been 
sincere, the notion that NCLB preserved local autonomy has been 
thoroughly discredited in the years following its enactment.116 NCLB 
 
Department of Education. Under Mr. Bush’s plan, it would become significantly more powerful, 
overseeing the yearly assessments of how schools and states have progressed.”). 
 107. Rudalevige, supra note 104, at 65; see also Kirst, supra note 4, at 31–32 (“Thus, 
Republican presidents had done an about-face, going from Reagan’s desire to dismantle the 
U.S. Department of Education to Bush’s dramatic expansion of Washington’s power over 
education.”). 
 108. President George W. Bush, Remarks on Submitting the Education Reform Plan to the 
Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 11, 12 (Jan. 23, 2001). 
 109. Id. (emphasis added). 
 110. Note, supra note 25, at 888. 
 111. GEORGE W. BUSH, NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 1 (2001), available at http://ed.gov/nclb/
overview/intro/presidentplan/proposal.pdf. 
 112. Bush, supra note 108, at 12; see also Ronald Brownstein, Bush Moves To Reposition 
Republicans on Education, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at A12 (“The core of Bush’s plan is his 
belief that ‘authority and accountability must be aligned at the local level’ . . . .” (quoting Bush, 
supra note 108, at 13)). 
 113. George W. Bush, Gov. George W. Bush’s Plans for Education in America, 82 PHI 
DELTA KAPPAN 122, 125–26 (2000); see also BUSH, supra note 111, at 7 (“Accountability for 
student performance must be accompanied by local control and flexibility.”). 
 114. BUSH, supra note 111, at 7. 
 115. Sue Kirchhoff, Schools Bursting with Issues, 58 CQ WKLY. 112, 113 (2000) (quoting 
then-Governor George W. Bush) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 116. See, e.g., Karen, supra note 29, at 17 (“One might wonder how Bush was able to bring 
such overwhelming majorities in Congress (381–41 in the House and 87–10 in the Senate) to 
support a bill that infringed on the prerogatives of so many, often cross-cutting, constituencies. 
States, districts, schools, and teachers have lost autonomy.”); Pinder, supra note 82, at 10 (“On 
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“imposes unprecedented requirements on the states and 
localities . . . it funds,”117 thereby mandating several substantive policy 
directives.118 First, NCLB orders states to develop plans that establish 
“challenging academic content standards” and “challenging student 
academic achievement standards.”119 To determine whether students 
are meeting these rigorous standards, states must “implement[] a set 
of high-quality, yearly student academic assessments” and must test 
students in third through eighth grades annually.120 States must also 
administer the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
biennially to test the rigor of their standards and to provide a measure 
of comparability among the states.121 
Perhaps most significantly, NCLB mandates “unprecedented 
gathering, analysis, and reporting of data by state education 
agencies.”122 States must publish their test results annually to 
demonstrate that a sufficient percentage of students have made 
“adequate yearly progress” (AYP) toward “proficient” academic 
achievement on the state assessments.123 Because one of NCLB’s 
primary goals is to eliminate the educational achievement gap, local 
educational agencies do not report “average test performance in 
schools, which can mask underperforming groups.”124 Instead, states 
must disaggregate their assessment data for four specific subgroups: 
(1) “economically disadvantaged students”; (2) “students from major 
racial and ethnic groups”; (3) “students with disabilities”; and (4) 
“students with limited English proficiency.”125 If each of the four 
subgroups has made “continuous and substantial improvement[s],” 
the school has made AYP.126 
 
the other hand, NCLB represented a sweeping change from the traditional roles of the various 
levels of government in education policy in that the federal role in educational achievement 
went from extreme deference to the states and districts to a much more prescriptive role.”). 
 117. Ryan, supra note 10, at 45. 
 118. Andrew G. Caffrey, Note, No Ambiguity Left Behind: A Discussion of the Clear 
Statement Rule and the Unfunded Mandates Clause of No Child Left Behind, 18 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 1129, 1130 (2010); Note, supra note 25, at 889. 
 119. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A) (2006). States must 
establish standards in mathematics, reading or language arts, and science. Id. § 6311(b)(1)(C). 
 120. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(A). 
 121. Id. § 6311(c)(2). 
 122. Kirst, supra note 4, at 32. 
 123. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(A)–(C). 
 124. Karen, supra note 29, at 16. 
 125. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II). 
 126. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(B)–(C). To achieve AYP, schools must also ensure that at least 95 
percent of the students in each subgroup take the assessments. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(I)(ii). By the 
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Finally, as President Bush promised, NCLB imposes increased 
accountability in the form of escalating actions against schools with 
unsatisfactory academic results. Any school that fails to make AYP 
for two consecutive years is “identif[ied] for school improvement.”127 
Schools in need of improvement face drastic sanctions: the state-
monitored local educational agency may replace the school staff who 
are relevant to the school’s failure to make AYP, may institute a new 
curriculum, may restructure the internal organizational structure of 
the school, or may extend the school year or school day.128 In addition, 
students who are enrolled in a school that is identified for school 
improvement are eligible to transfer to another public school in the 
district.129 
The fact that NCLB, a law that “effected a substantial . . . power 
grab of education policy from the states,”130 passed with 
overwhelming bipartisan majorities in both the House and the 
Senate131 evidenced yet another shift in congressional thinking about 
the proper role of the federal government in education. The 
enactment of the ESEA was defended as a means of achieving 
educational equity for disadvantaged students, and Congress 
rationalized the creation of the Department of Education by citing 
staggering bureaucratic inefficiency.132 With NCLB, however, 
Congress boldly seized legislative authority over two quintessential 
areas of state control: academic achievement and education policy 
and reform.133 
In United States v. Lopez,134 the Court expressed its concern that 
too expansive an interpretation of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
 
end of the 2013–2014 school year, every public school in America is expected to attain 100 
percent proficiency in all four subgroups. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(F). 
 127. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(A). 
 128. Id. § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv). 
 129. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i). 
 130. Note, supra note 25, at 886. 
 131. The House voted 381–41 in favor of NCLB, and the Senate count was 87–10. McGuinn, 
supra note 24, at 57. 
 132. See supra notes 27, 34–36, 66–68, 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 133. See Kirst, supra note 4, at 36 (“When it was felt that states could not be relied upon to 
meet achievement goals either, more decisionmaking moved to Washington, most recently with 
NCLB.”); cf. Susan H. Fuhrman, Less than Meets the Eye: Standards, Testing, and Fear of 
Federal Control, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE?, supra note 4, at 131, 131 (“When Washington 
starts issuing mandates about standards for student learning and how to assess that learning, 
controversies begin. Such policies, after all, have strong implications for school curriculums, and 
federal control of curriculum has long been taboo.”). 
 134. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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power might enable the federal government to “regulate the 
educational process directly.”135 Congress might, for example, 
“mandate a federal curriculum,” the Court warned.136 Though NCLB 
was not enacted pursuant to Congress’s commerce power, its 
enactment validates the Court’s concerns in Lopez. If Congress can 
use $20 billion in funding137 to strong-arm states into enacting 
standards, conducting regular standardized assessments, and 
dedicating attention to the educational achievement gap, the 
possibility that Congress might mandate a federal curriculum—or 
anything else in the field of education, for that matter—seems very 
plausible indeed. 
II.  THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN THE FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATION OF POWER 
The federal appropriation of power has not been achieved by 
Congress alone. The Supreme Court has been complicit in the 
gradual seizure of control from state and local education authorities. 
As many scholars have observed, the aggrandizement of federal 
involvement in public education has been facilitated in large part by 
the Supreme Court’s decision not to impose any meaningful 
restrictions on Congress’s prodigious spending power.138 Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution provides that Congress has the “Power 
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of 
the United States.”139 Although the meaning of “general welfare” has 
been the source of considerable debate,140 the Supreme Court clarified 
 
 135. Id. at 565. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Kirst, supra note 4, at 23. 
 138. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 10, at 48–49 (“The expansive scope of Congress’s authority 
under the Spending Clause is especially important in the field of education, for the simple 
reason that most federal education programs have been enacted pursuant to this power.”); 
Umpstead, supra note 7, at 203 (“In spite of its inability directly to regulate education, Congress 
has passed a series of laws that have significantly influenced the educational program 
throughout the country. To do this, Congress has utilized its spending power under Article I, 
Section 8, clause 1 to induce the states to cooperate with its policies.”). 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
 140. Two Framers, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, advocated opposing readings 
of the Spending Clause. Ryan, supra note 10, at 49. Madison argued that Congress’s spending 
power was restricted by its enumerated powers under the Constitution. Id. Hamilton believed, 
however, that Congress could use its spending power to pursue goals outside of its enumerated 
powers, as long as the spending advanced the general welfare. Id. 
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the scope of Congress’s authority in United States v. Butler,141 holding 
that Congress could use its spending power to regulate the states 
indirectly in ways that it could not otherwise directly mandate.142 
In South Dakota v. Dole,143 the “most recent and thorough 
pronouncement on the scope of the Spending Clause,”144 the Supreme 
Court established five criteria for determining the constitutionality of 
a conditional spending law.145 First, the spending legislation must be 
“in pursuit of the ‘general welfare.’”146 Second, any conditional strings 
must be stated clearly and unambiguously, enabling states to make an 
informed choice whether to accept the federal funds.147 Third, the 
conditions must be related to “the federal interest in particular 
national projects or programs.”148 Fourth, Congress cannot use 
conditional spending legislation to induce states to engage in activities 
that are unconstitutional.149 Fifth, the financial inducement associated 
with the legislation cannot be so coercive that it becomes 
compulsive.150 
In the years following Dole, these five requirements have proved 
to be “entirely toothless.”151 The Court has not enforced any of the 
five restrictions with any zeal and has exhibited extreme deference in 
considering whether a particular expenditure serves the general 
 
 141. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
 142. Id. at 66 (“[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for 
public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the 
Constitution.”). 
 143. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 144. Ryan, supra note 10, at 50. 
 145. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08, 211. In Dole, the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
legislation that conditioned the receipt of federal highway funds on states’ willingness to enact 
laws raising the legal drinking age. Id. at 205–06. 
 146. Id. at 207 (quoting Comm’r v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); Butler, 297 U.S. at 
65). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 207–08. 
 149. Id. at 208. 
 150. Id. at 211. 
 151. Note, supra note 25, at 891; see also Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the 
Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2003) (“It was 
suggested, and perhaps even expected, that the Dole exceptions . . . would be swept into the 
maelstrom of a post-Lopez revolution. Instead, New Federalism notwithstanding, Congress’s 
essentially unquestioned power to spend money, with regulatory strings attached, continues to 
provide practically limitless opportunities for the national government indirectly to shape policy 
at the state and local levels of society and government.” (footnote omitted)). 
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welfare.152 In fact, the Court has rejected every federalism-based 
challenge to federal appropriations legislation since 1936.153 This 
remarkably deferential disposition has allowed Congress to invoke its 
spending power to circumvent traditional federalism parameters and 
to disrupt the federal-state balance that has long existed with respect 
to public education.154 
In the education sphere, the Court’s expansive reading of the 
Spending Clause has afforded Congress “almost unfettered discretion 
to direct the education policies of the states.”155 Major pieces of 
education legislation like the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA)156 and NCLB offer states millions of dollars in federal 
grants in exchange for compliance with increasingly stringent 
educational requirements.157 Although states theoretically have the 
power to reject Congress’s directives, their autonomy is in actuality 
severely constrained.158 Cash-strapped states are increasingly being 
forced to cede power to the federal government, allowing Congress to 
transform itself into a monolithic dictator of education policy.159 
Although the Supreme Court’s role in the federal appropriation 
of authority over education has taken a back seat to Congress’s, the 
Court has been a powerful accomplice. Instead of checking the 
 
 152. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (“In considering whether a particular expenditure is intended 
to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of 
Congress.”); id. at 207 n.2 (“The level of deference to the congressional decision is such that the 
Court has more recently questioned whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable 
restriction at all.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1976) (per curiam))). For 
examples of cases in which the Court has affirmed Dole’s deferential approach to the Spending 
Clause, see Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295–
96 (2006); Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 604–08 (2004); United States v. American Library 
Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 202–03 (2003); and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1992). 
 153. Brett D. Proctor, Note, Using the Spending Power To Circumvent City of Boerne v. 
Flores: Why the Court Should Require Constitutional Consistency in Its Unconstitutional 
Conditions Analysis, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 469, 477 (2000). 
 154. Id. at 469–70. 
 155. Ryan, supra note 10, at 43. 
 156. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006). 
 157. See Ryan, supra note 10, at 44 (“All major federal programs, including Title I and 
IDEA, provide money to states and localities, and the money comes with strings that, over the 
years, have formed a tangled web of rules and regulations enveloping public schools.”). 
 158. See Michael Salerno, Note, Reading Is Fundamental: Why the No Child Left Behind Act 
Necessitates Recognition of a Fundamental Right to Education, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 509, 538 (2007) (“While any state is free to decline to follow NCLB, a decision to do 
so would result in the state’s loss of federal education assistance. This result is impractical for 
states, as they are incapable of funding education without federal assistance.”). 
 159. Id. 
BOYCE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2012  10:42 PM 
1048 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1025 
legislature’s influence, the judiciary has consistently exercised 
restraint, and thus has facilitated the federal takeover. 
III.  THE FEDERAL REJECTION OF A FEDERAL RIGHT 
Given the staggering pace at which Congress has expanded the 
scope of its authority over education, one might reasonably conclude 
that the federal government’s desire to engage in education reform 
has no limits. Yet both Congress and the Supreme Court have refused 
to venture beyond one particular frontier: neither the legislature nor 
the judiciary has been willing to formalize a federal right to 
education. 
Congress’s rejection of a fundamental constitutional right to 
education has been implicit; the legislature has simply never acted to 
amend the Constitution and establish the right.160 Despite support 
from various members of Congress and from at least one presidential 
administration in favor of a constitutional amendment formalizing a 
right to education, Congress has never seriously considered making 
such a change.161 
The Supreme Court, by contrast, has explicitly considered the 
issue. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly affirmed the importance of education.162 
Nevertheless, the Court has refused to recognize a fundamental right 
to education under the federal Constitution, even after the passage of 
the ESEA and the creation of the Department of Education.163 
The seminal case regarding a federal fundamental right to 
education is San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. In 
that case, the parents of Mexican-American schoolchildren 
challenged Texas’s school-finance system, arguing that their children 
 
 160. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 162. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“In addition, education provides the 
basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. 
In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”); Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to 
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities . . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. . . . In these days, it is doubtful 
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always 
regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which 
should be diligently promoted.”). 
 163. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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were not receiving equal educational opportunities because of their 
socioeconomic class.164 Due to its heavy reliance on local property 
taxes, Texas’s funding scheme had generated substantial interdistrict 
disparities: Edgewood, the poorest district in San Antonio, received 
$356 in funding per pupil, whereas Alamo Heights, the most affluent 
district, received $594 per pupil.165 The plaintiffs contended that these 
dramatic funding disparities amounted to discrimination on the basis 
of wealth and, thus, that they constituted a violation of their 
children’s rights to equal protection.166 
To evaluate the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the Court 
questioned whether the state’s funding system “operate[d] to the 
disadvantage of some suspect class or impinge[d] upon a fundamental 
right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.”167 The 
Court first held that indigent individuals did not constitute a 
protected class, noting that the plaintiffs had not been relegated to a 
position of political powerlessness or absolutely deprived of any 
meaningful benefit.168 Next, despite affirming the “undisputed 
importance of education,” the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
fundamental-right argument.169 According to the Court, a 
fundamental right to education is neither explicitly nor implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution, even if education might be 
considered a necessary prerequisite to the effective exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms and the right to vote.170 
Although most courts have interpreted Rodriguez as precluding 
a federal right to education, this reading oversimplifies the Court’s 
nuanced holding.171 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell first 
 
 164. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1973). 
 165. Id. at 12–13, 15. 
 166. Id. at 17. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 23–24, 28. 
 169. Id. at 35. 
 170. Id. at 33–37. 
 171. E.g., Greenspahn, supra note 20, at 768; see also Penelope A. Preovolos, Rodriguez 
Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful Access, and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 75, 83 (1980) (“[C]ontrary to a popular misconception of the Rodriguez holding, 
the Court did not decide that education is not a fundamental right, but that the facts of 
Rodriguez did not violate that right. Furthermore, there is no right to equal education per se, 
but there may be a right to whatever quantum of education is required for the meaningful 
exercise of other rights.” (footnote omitted)); Emily Barbour, Note, Separate and Invisible: 
Alternative Education Programs and Our Educational Rights, 50 B.C. L. REV. 197, 210–11 (2009) 
(“[T]he idea that there may be a fundamental right to an identifiable quantum of education lives 
on as Rodriguez’s ‘unheld holding.’ The Court recognizes this inconsistency, citing Rodriguez 
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explained that education is not afforded explicit or implicit protection 
under the Constitution.172 Justice Powell then, however, raised the 
possibility that “some identifiable quantum of education” might be 
constitutionally protected and that an “absolute denial of educational 
opportunities” in other circumstances might interfere with a 
fundamental right.173 
The Court took up the issue of a fundamental right to education 
again in Plyler v. Doe,174 which held that Texas could not deny 
undocumented children enrollment in its public schools.175 In Plyler, 
the Court again equivocated. “Public education is not a ‘right’ 
granted to individuals by the Constitution,” the Court declared.176 
“But neither is it merely some governmental ‘benefit’ 
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation.”177 
Because of what it described as education’s “fundamental role in 
maintaining the fabric of our society,”178 the Court applied heightened 
scrutiny in analyzing Texas’s statute.179 This decision—to forgo 
rational basis review in favor of some form of intermediate scrutiny—
seemed, in the words of one commentator, to “confirm that 
Rodriguez left open the possibility that some level of education is a 
constitutionally protected fundamental right.”180 
The Court last addressed this issue in Papasan v. Allain181 and 
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools182 with ambiguous results. In 
Papasan, a 1986 decision, the Court examined Mississippi’s 
disbursement of land funds for public schools.183 Referencing both 
 
both for the proposition that there is no fundamental right to education and for the proposition 
that there may be a fundamental right to education.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Susan H. 
Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A 
Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 566 (1992))). 
 172. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
 173. Id. at 36–37. 
 174. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 175. Id. at 230. 
 176. Id. at 221. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Exactly what level of scrutiny the Court actually applied is unclear, as the Court slightly 
confused the standard terminology of equal protection: “In light of these countervailing costs, 
the discrimination contained in [the Texas statute] can hardly be considered rational unless it 
furthers some substantial goal of the State.” Id. at 224 (emphasis added). 
 180. Greenspahn, supra note 20, at 769. 
 181. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986). 
 182. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988). 
 183. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 267–68. 
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Rodriguez and Plyler, the Court noted that “the question[] whether a 
minimally adequate education is a fundamental right” meriting 
“heightened equal protection review” had not yet been definitively 
settled.184 Two years later, in Kadrmas, the plaintiffs challenged their 
school district’s decision to charge students for a door-to-door bus 
service,185 contending that the user fees unconstitutionally deprived 
indigent children of “minimum access to education.”186 This time, the 
Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny, refusing to extend Plyler 
beyond its “unique circumstances.”187 After all, noted Justice 
O’Connor, the Court had never “accepted the proposition that 
education is a ‘fundamental right’ [that] should trigger strict scrutiny 
when government interferes with an individual’s access to it.”188 
The precedential value of Rodriguez and its successors is unclear. 
The only unequivocal truth that can be extracted from these four 
cases is that a federally protected right to education has never been 
affirmatively established. 
IV.  AN IMPLICIT FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RODRIGUEZ 
Since the Court decided Rodriguez in 1973, numerous legal 
scholars have lambasted the decision and have articulated lengthy 
pleas for the Court to recognize a fundamental right to education.189 
Professors Cass Sunstein, Laurence Tribe, and Erwin Chemerinsky, 
three of the most renowned constitutional law scholars of their 
generation, have all criticized Rodriguez190 and censured the Burger 
Court for failing at such a “critical juncture in the battle for 
educational equality.”191 This chorus of opposition has accused 
 
 184. Id. at 285. 
 185. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 453–55. 
 186. Id. at 458. 
 187. Id. at 459–60 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 188. Id. at 458 (quoting Papasan, 478 U.S. at 284; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 189. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 190. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 140 (1993); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-52, at 1654, § 16-58, at 1667 (2d ed. 1988); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure To Achieve Equal 
Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1000 (1994). 
 191. Chemerinsky, supra note 190, at 999. 
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Rodriguez of stalling the effort to equalize educational opportunity 
and of forsaking the “majestic promise of Brown.”192 
In the face of Rodriguez’s widespread excoriation, a few scholars 
have risen to the Court’s defense, arguing that the case was decided 
correctly.193 Professor Edward Foley, for example, asserts that 
Rodriguez was decided correctly under both a “strict originalist” and 
a “moral” reading of the Constitution.194 According to Professor 
Foley, strict originalists evaluating Rodriguez need only cite the 
Framers’ lack of any “specific intent to ban unequal levels of 
spending per student among different school districts within a 
state.”195 Professor Foley concedes that strict originalism may be a 
“rather unattractive theory of constitutional interpretation” at times, 
but he bolsters his strict-originalism argument with a moral reading of 
the Equal Protection Clause.196 Although Professor Foley agrees that 
the Fourteenth Amendment embodies the “fundamental principle” 
that all humans have equal intrinsic value, he maintains that 
disparities in educational opportunities “do[] not necessarily violate 
the principle of intrinsic equality.”197 Rather, just as Rodriguez 
suggested, the Constitution requires only a minimum level of 
educational opportunity.198 As Professor Foley himself hints, however, 
his published support of Rodriguez places him in the minority among 
legal scholars.199 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. See, e.g., John Dayton, When All Else Has Failed: Resolving the School Funding 
Problem, 1995 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 19–20 (“Although it may be tempting to embrace judicial 
action as a panacea for school funding inequities, political reality dictates otherwise. Political 
reality supports the Court’s conclusion in San Antonio v. Rodriguez that ‘the ultimate solutions 
must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.’” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973))); 
Foley, supra note 20, at 541 (“If Rodriguez had imposed a requirement of equal educational 
opportunity, as some prominent constitutional scholars still wish, the Court would have been 
acting as tyrannical philosopher-kings, usurping the democratic authority of the people and 
their elected representatives.”). 
 194. Foley, supra note 20, at 476–78. Professor Foley borrows the notion of a moral reading 
of the Constitution from Professor Ronald Dworkin. Id. at 477 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1–14 (1996)). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 477–79. 
 197. Id. at 478–79. 
 198. Id. at 479. 
 199. See id. at 476–77 (noting the widespread criticism of Rodriguez within the legal 
community and acknowledging that “academic commentators [have not] satisfactorily 
defended” the case). 
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Another scholar, Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the Sixth Circuit, 
contends that regardless of whether Rodriguez was rightly or wrongly 
decided, the plaintiffs in the case “potentially gained by losing.”200 In 
his article on the decision, Judge Sutton describes the states’ reaction 
to Rodriguez and argues that the states were better equipped to 
address the complex and diverse issues of school financing and 
educational spending than the federal government was anyway: 
As the Rodriguez story suggests, the answer to the pragmatist 
judge’s question—“What happens if we do nothing?”—is not 
invariably that the States will do nothing, and it occasionally may be 
that the States will do more for a given cause than the federal courts 
ever could have done.201 
This Note similarly contends that perhaps the plaintiffs in 
Rodriguez “gained by losing,” though for different reasons from those 
Judge Sutton articulates. This Part argues that Congress’s enactment 
of NCLB, in conjunction with the Department of Education’s 
growing prominence, has established an implicit federal right to 
education that is equivalent, and perhaps even superior, to any right 
the judiciary could identify and protect. Thus, even if the pervasive 
derision Rodriguez inspired when it was handed down was well 
founded, pleas for the Court to overrule the decision are now largely 
unnecessary. 
A. The Cases for and Against Implicit Legislated Rights 
Whether legislation can implicitly establish a right is not a settled 
question.202 The clearest rights, of course, are those that are explicitly 
enshrined in positive law—the right to free speech,203 for example, or 
the right to be free from sex discrimination when participating in an 
 
 200. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Essay, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its 
Aftermath, 94 VA. L. REV. 1963, 1978 (2008). 
 201. Id. at 1986. 
 202. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), for example, suggests that Congress 
cannot confer a right unless it “‘speak[s] with a clear voice,’ and manifests an ‘unambiguous’ 
intent,” id. at 280 (alteration in original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). Similarly, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 
(1981), cautioned courts not to “attribute to Congress an unstated intent” and infer substantive 
rights or private causes of action, particularly when such inferences would “impose affirmative 
obligations on the States,” id. at 16–17; see also infra notes 205–07. 
 203. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
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educational program.204 Yet courts have also historically recognized 
implicit rights that are not clearly enumerated in a specific textual 
provision. For instance, under the doctrine of substantive due process, 
courts have identified fundamental rights ranging from the right to 
marry205 to the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their 
children.206 These rights, although not mentioned in the Constitution, 
are, according to the Court, protected either by the word “liberty” in 
the Due Process Clause or by the “penumbras” of various 
amendments in the Bill of Rights.207 
At the most basic level, when a court recognizes a right, it is 
doing two things. First, the court is preserving some modicum of 
positive or negative liberty.208 Second, the court is ensuring that a 
remedy exists should that liberty be infringed.209 As the subsequent 
Sections in this Part explain, these two things—preserving a liberty 
interest and ensuring a remedy—are precisely what the passage of 
 
 204. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
 205. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires 
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under 
our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the 
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”). 
 206. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (“Under the doctrine of 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 [(1923)], we think it entirely plain that the [law in question] 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1965) (“In other words, the 
First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental 
intrusion. . . . [S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations 
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”). Of course, a sizable contingent 
of legal scholars, including Justices Scalia and Thomas, would contend that rights can be 
established only if they are identified explicitly, whether in the text of the federal Constitution, a 
state constitution, a statute, or a regulation. This Note’s argument, however, is not incompatible 
with these scholars’ textualist approaches to the Constitution. This Note does not hinge on 
whether the Constitution protects—or theoretically could protect—a substantive-due-process 
right to education, nor does it aim to prove that implicit rights are legitimate or even possible. 
Rather, this Note makes the more modest argument that the protections individuals enjoy under 
NCLB and the auspices of the Department of Education are comparable to the protections 
individuals would enjoy pursuant to a formalized right, whether it be enshrined in a constitution 
or in a statute. See infra notes 209–62 and accompanying text. 
 208. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 209. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled and 
invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its 
proper redress.”); id. at 163 (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”). 
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NCLB and the Department of Education’s role in enforcing NCLB 
have accomplished. 
The most immediate response to this proposition is that a right 
recognized implicitly by Congress could never rival—and certainly 
could never trump—a constitutional right. After all, constitutional 
rights sit atop the hierarchy of rights in terms of the reverence they 
enjoy, and they are virtually impossible to rescind.210 Thus, as this line 
of thinking goes, those who deride the holding in Rodriguez have a 
compelling reason to continue their chorus of opposition for as long 
as a constitutional right to education is denied. 
This argument, however, overestimates the value of an explicit 
right recognized by the judiciary and underestimates the power of an 
implicit right recognized by Congress. First, although constitutional 
rights are nearly impossible to rescind, doing so is not impossible, 
particularly when the right is not expressly mentioned in the 
Constitution or a statute. As the oft-maligned case Lochner v. New 
York211 demonstrates, implicit constitutional rights are not necessarily 
irrevocable. Lochner infamously invoked a right to freedom of 
contract,212 a right that was later abandoned in West Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish.213 Similarly, Dred Scott v. Sandford,214 another blight on the 
Court’s record, affirmed “the right of property in a slave” and the 
right of citizens to engage in slave trafficking.215 These rights were 
 
 210. Cf. Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1948) (“Clearly, the 
general rule is that ‘powers derived wholly from a statute are extinguished by its 
repeal.’ . . . This being true, so long as the claims, if they were purely statutory, had not ripened 
into final judgment, regardless of whether the activities on which they were based had been 
performed, they were subject to whatever action Congress might take with respect to them.” 
(quoting Flanigan v. Sierra Cnty., 196 U.S. 553, 560 (1905))). 
 211. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 212. See id. at 53 (“The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of 
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution.”). 
 213. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); see also id. at 392 (“But it was 
recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified and not 
an absolute right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses.” 
(quoting Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
 214. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 215. See id. at 451–52 (“[T]he right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed 
in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and 
property, was guarantied to the citizens of the United States, in every State that might desire it, 
for twenty years. And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future 
time, if the slaves escapes from his owner.”). 
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later resoundingly rescinded with the passage of the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.216 Hence, although revoking implicit 
constitutional rights that have been recognized by the Court might be 
anomalous, even if Rodriguez had established an implicit 
constitutional right to education, that right would not be indubitably 
impervious to future attack. 
Second, a right to education that has been implicitly recognized 
by Congress—albeit easier to repeal than a constitutional right—is 
unlikely to be eroded or rescinded, for pragmatic and political, if not 
jurisprudential, reasons. When Congress establishes a new statutory 
scheme, particularly a scheme that enshrines a right, the momentum 
in favor of such a scheme and the “inertial forces” that often tie 
Congress’s hands are unlikely to allow for a “bold” departure.217 
Having grown accustomed to policies that suggest a federal 
commitment to education over five decades, the American people are 
unlikely to support the federal government’s drastically scaling back 
its commitment to public education. In effect, the implicit right to 
education protected by NCLB and the Department of Education is 
probably already so “embedded in the fabric of American politics” 
that it has “become, if not impregnable, then at least firmly resistant 
to assault.”218 
For these reasons, the contention that a constitutional right 
affirmed by the Supreme Court would be the preeminent 
 
 216. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). The Court’s 
shift in position from Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), to Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558 (2003), as well as its willingness to reconsider Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), further demonstrates 
the potentially transitory nature of implicit constitutional rights recognized by the judiciary. 
 217. DAVIES, supra note 3, at 2; see also Liaquat Ali Khan, A Portfolio Theory of Foreign 
Affairs: U.S. Relations with the Muslim World, 20 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 406 
(2011) (“The President can request that Congress modify or repeal a certain statutory portfolio. 
But such requests rarely materialize, because repealing a federal statute requires a new political 
consensus in both chambers of Congress.”); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: 
The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 505 n.66 (1997) (“The burden of inertia in 
repealing existing legislation is another unavoidable consequence of a present generation’s right 
to control the present.”). 
 218. See DAVIES, supra note 3, at 2. 
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accomplishment for education advocates is cogent but not irrefutable 
or insuperable; in fact, it may be misguided. In the following Sections, 
this Note first compares the right to education that presumably would 
have been established under Rodriguez with the right that has been 
implicitly recognized by Congress under NCLB. It then defends the 
hypothesis that the protections the Rodriguez Court could have 
formalized would have been no more expansive than the protections 
available under NCLB, insofar as those protections are enforced by 
the Department of Education. 
B. Equity- Versus Adequacy-Based Rights to Education 
Rodriguez and the numerous state-finance cases that were 
litigated under state constitutional provisions in its wake219 volunteer 
two possible versions of a right to education.220 The first wave of cases 
envisioned a right to education grounded in equity.221 The equity-
based right to education guarantees equal educational opportunities 
to all students, regardless of their race, gender, or disability.222 The 
second wave of cases suggested a right to education grounded in 
adequacy.223 The adequacy-based right to education focuses on the 
quality of education students are receiving and demands that school 
 
 219. E.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (en banc); Rose v. Council for Better 
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997); Tenn. 
Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993). 
 220. See Lauren Nicole Gillespie, Note, The Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation: 
Pursuing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 991 (2010) 
(noting that advocates changed litigation strategy after Rodriguez “from seeking equitable 
funding across all school districts to ensuring that all districts have sufficient funding to provide 
their students an adequate education”); see also Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken 
Duties: A New Theory for School Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1202 (2011) 
(describing three waves of cases but identifying the same two “distinct theories of legal action”). 
 221. E.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994) (en 
banc); Serrano, 487 P.2d 1241; McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139. Some courts have alternatively used 
the word “equality.” E.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 207. 
 222. See, e.g., McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 140–41 (“The provisions of the constitution 
guaranteeing equal protection . . . require that the educational opportunities provided . . . be 
substantially equal. The constitution, therefore, imposes upon the General Assembly the 
obligation to maintain and support a system of free public schools that affords substantially 
equal educational opportunities to all students.”). 
 223. E.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995); Leandro, 
488 S.E.2d 249; Abbeville Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999). Many scholars 
actually discuss school-funding litigation in terms of three waves: “federal equality litigation, 
state equality litigation, and state adequacy litigation.” Gillespie, supra note 220, at 991; see also, 
e.g., Tang, supra note 220, at 1202. Because this Note is focused solely on the possibility of a 
federal right to education, it has simply collapsed these “three waves” into two general visions of 
what a right to education might look like. 
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districts meet certain minimum standards.224 In creating the 
Department of Education and enacting NCLB, Congress unofficially 
instituted a federal right to education that conforms with both of 
these visions. 
1. No Child Left Behind and an Equity-Based Right to Education.  
In Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.,225 the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky provided a useful explanation of an equity-based right to 
education: 
Each child, every child, . . . must be provided with an equal 
opportunity to have an adequate education. Equality is the key word 
here. The children of the poor and the children of the rich, the 
children who live in poor districts and the children who live in rich 
districts must be given the same opportunity and access to an 
adequate education.226 
This vision is strikingly consistent with the vision set forth in NCLB, 
which seeks to “ensure that all children have a fair, equal, and 
significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education.”227 Its 
provisions embody Congress’s express purpose of “closing the 
achievement gap . . . between minority and nonminority students, and 
between disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers.”228 
This objective is precisely what the litigants in equity-based education 
lawsuits were seeking: the assurance that classifications like race and 
socioeconomic status would not interfere with educational access and 
opportunity.229 
In particular, NCLB’s disaggregation requirements help secure 
this right. NCLB requires states to disaggregate the results of their 
standardized tests by “race, ethnicity, gender, disability status, 
migrant status, English proficiency, and status as economically 
 
 224. See, e.g., Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 254 (“The principal question presented by this 
argument is whether the people’s constitutional right to education has any qualitative content, 
that is, whether the state is required to provide children with an education that meets some 
minimum standard of quality. We answer that question in the affirmative and conclude that the 
right to education provided in the state constitution is a right to a sound basic education. An 
education that does not serve the purpose of preparing students to participate and compete in 
the society in which they live and work is devoid of substance and is constitutionally 
inadequate.”). 
 225. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
 226. Id. at 211. 
 227. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 228. Id. § 6301(3). 
 229. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
BOYCE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2012  10:42 PM 
2012] THE OBSOLESCENCE OF RODRIGUEZ 1059 
disadvantaged.”230 Under NCLB, a school cannot achieve AYP unless 
students in each of these traditionally underserved groups are making 
“continuous and substantial” academic progress.231 Essentially, these 
requirements prevent schools from using their high-performing 
students’ scores to mask the fact that they are neglecting students in 
the traditionally low-performing subgroups.232 By hinging schools’ 
ability to make AYP on the success of these historically 
disadvantaged groups, Congress has forced schools to provide equal 
educational opportunities for students in each subgroup.233 
2. No Child Left Behind and an Adequacy-Based Right to 
Education.  The second half of NCLB’s express purpose clarifies 
exactly what “all children” are promised: “significant opportunity to 
obtain a high-quality education and reach, at a minimum, proficiency 
on challenging State academic achievement standards and state 
academic assessments.”234 This portion of NCLB’s “purpose” 
provision speaks to Congress’s establishment of an adequacy-based 
right to education. 
An adequacy-based right to education guarantees students a 
certain minimum level of proficiency.235 For example, in Leandro v. 
State,236 a North Carolina education-finance case, the court held that 
the state must provide students with four basic skills that will allow 
them to succeed in the future.237 In Rose, the Kentucky Supreme 
Court held that students’ “right to an adequate education” meant that 
the state must ensure that “each and every child” has attained seven 
specific “capacities,” including “sufficient oral and written 
communication skills . . . to function in a complex and rapidly 
changing civilization” and “sufficient knowledge of economic, social, 
 
 230. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(h)(1)(C)(i). 
 231. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II). 
 232. Sarah L. Browning, Will Residency Be Relevant to Public Education in the Twenty-First 
Century?, 8 PIERCE L. REV. 297, 333 (2010). 
 233. See Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 158–59 (2009) 
(“NCLB’s requirement that adequate yearly progress goals be met by subgroups that include 
both minorities and students with disabilities may be the prime motivator for schools to increase 
the intensity of services given to both African-American children and children with disabilities.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 234. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (footnote omitted). 
 235. Christina Payne-Tsoupros, No Child Left Behind: Disincentives To Focus Instruction on 
Students Above the Passing Threshold, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 471, 471 (2010). 
 236. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). 
 237. Id. at 255. 
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and political systems to enable the student to make informed 
choices.”238 NCLB focuses on student achievement in three subject 
areas—language arts, mathematics, and science239—and pledges that 
by the end of the 2013–2014 school year, every child in America will 
be proficient in each.240 
NCLB assures this federal right to an adequate education 
through several different strategies. Most obviously, NCLB 
commands states to enact challenging standards.241 This requirement 
closely corresponds with the notion that an adequacy-based right to 
education guarantees a minimum bar below which academic 
instruction cannot fall. States are then required to create rigorous 
assessments that will measure whether students are actually receiving 
an adequate education.242 In addition, states must administer the 
NAEP biennially to ensure that individual states have not set the 
minimum educational floor too low.243 
Perhaps most importantly, NCLB requires states to create plans 
that ensure that every teacher of a core subject in the state is “highly-
qualified.”244 To be “highly-qualified,” teachers must have at least a 
bachelor’s degree, must satisfy all state certification requirements, 
and must have a high level of competency in their assigned subjects.245 
Numerous studies have identified teacher quality as the top 
determinant of student success.246 Therefore, requirements that would 
place an effective teacher in every classroom are a critical part of 
providing students with an adequate education. 
 
 238. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989). 
 239. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(C). 
 240. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(F). 
 241. Id. § 6311(b)(1)(A). 
 242. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(A), (C). 
 243. Id. § 6311(c)(2). 
 244. Id. § 6319(a)(1)–(2). 
 245. Id. § 7801(23). 
 246. See, e.g., DAN GOLDHABER WITH EMILY ANTHONY, TEACHER QUALITY AND 
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 7–9 (ERIC Clearinghouse on Urb. Educ., Urban Diversity Ser. No. 
115, 2003), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED477271.pdf (presenting studies 
demonstrating that student achievement is best predicted by “teacher quality”); Derek W. 
Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation: All Things Are Not Equal, 44 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 107, 119 (2009) (noting research that shows “quality instruction is the most important 
factor . . . in predicting academic success”). 
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C. Comparing a Legislatively Recognized and a Court-Recognized 
Right to Education 
1. Similarities.  Congress cannot absolutely guarantee that 
schools will honor students’ rights to education, but neither can the 
courts. The judiciary simply has the capacity to identify rights and 
then to provide relief when those rights are violated. By enacting 
NCLB and tasking the Department of Education with its 
enforcement, Congress has effectively done the same thing.247 First, as 
discussed in Section B, Congress has implicitly identified a federal 
right to education grounded in both notions of equity and adequacy. 
Then, Congress has preemptively established remedies should schools 
violate students’ rights to education. 
Were the Supreme Court to recognize a fundamental right to 
education, plaintiffs presumably would not have available to them 
any more remedies than NCLB already provides.248 Under NCLB, 
schools whose students fail to obtain proficiency are identified for 
improvement.249 Students in these schools enjoy two kinds of 
remedies. First, NCLB imposes strict requirements geared toward 
immediately improving the education the school is providing. For 
example, schools can be forced to reopen as charter schools, to 
replace their entire staffs, or to submit to an executive state 
takeover.250 In addition, schools “needing improvement” are required 
to incorporate scientifically based research into their teaching 
methods and to provide “high-quality professional development” to 
all teachers and principals to help address the specific academic issues 
the school is having.251 Second, NCLB provides a remedy to ensure 
that students whose educational rights have been violated are 
protected thenceforward. Students in schools that have failed to meet 
AYP are entitled to transfer to a higher-performing school,252 or they 
can force their schools to provide supplemental instructional 
services.253 Together, these sanctions serve to protect students’ federal 
rights to education in the same way judicial remedies would.254 
 
 247. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. 
 248. For counterarguments to this proposition, see infra Part IV.C.3. 
 249. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(A). 
 250. Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B). 
 251. Id. § 6316(b)(3)(A)(iii). 
 252. Id. § 6316(b)(1)(E). 
 253. Id. § 6316(b)(5)(B), (e)(1). 
 254. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
BOYCE IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 1/25/2012  10:42 PM 
1062 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:1025 
2. Congressional Superiority.  Not only is Congress able to 
provide equivalent remedies, but in many ways, the protection 
available under NCLB is superior to the protection the Court could 
provide by recognizing a fundamental right to education. To begin 
with, Congress’s ability to enforce both the right and its remedies is 
far superior to the Supreme Court’s. As the states’ lethargic reaction 
to Brown illustrated, the Court has very little leverage actually to 
induce states to take action.255 Congress, by contrast, has the power of 
the purse and can employ this formidable bargaining chip as a means 
of ensuring state compliance.256 In accordance with this principle, 
NCLB establishes harsh sanctions for states that violate students’ 
implicit rights to education. The secretary of education is authorized 
to withhold all federal funding from states that fail to establish 
challenging standards or rigorous statewide assessments.257 
Institutional-competence considerations similarly weigh in favor 
of a legislatively enforced right to education. Since the federal 
judiciary’s first foray into public education in Brown, the Court has 
repeatedly insisted that it is ill equipped to correct problems in 
American schools.258 Judges lack both the administrative capacity to 
evaluate potential educational reforms and the training to make 
critical policy decisions.259 Consequently, judicial inquiries are usually 
limited to comparing concrete, tangible factors like physical facilities, 
instructional materials, and budgets,260 and their remedies are 
 
 255. See Jack Greenberg, Report on Roma Education Today: From Slavery to Segregation 
and Beyond, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 919, 983 (2010) (“Desegregation in the United States was 
hobbled from the outset by ‘massive resistance,’ as school districts did not even pretend to 
comply with Brown.”). 
 256. See supra Part I.C. 
 257. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(g). 
 258. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974) (explaining that “few, if any, 
judges are qualified” to devise remedies in segregated school districts). 
 259. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption 
of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1253 (2006) 
(“Courts . . . must look at problems one case at a time, which may prevent them from taking an 
appropriately global view of a given issue. They must rely on the information presented by the 
parties and their amici or engage in their own independent inquiry. But the parties’ data may be 
skewed to support only one side of the dispute, and courts typically lack the resources—the 
time, the expertise, the sheer manpower—to collect and digest vast amounts of extra-record 
data.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 260. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 191–93 (Ky. 1989) 
(documenting the lower courts’ findings of fact on the efficiency of the local school system—
findings based on facilities, personnel, and instructional materials). 
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necessarily couched in abstract directives.261 Congress, by contrast, can 
delve into the minutiae by consulting experts and holding legislative 
hearings, and it therefore regularly makes policy decisions with 
confidence.262 
Congress’s institutional competence is also superior in terms of 
regulatory power. Because Congress can delegate enforcement 
responsibilities to the Department of Education, it can regulate 
schools’ observance of students’ rights in a manner the Court cannot. 
Whereas the Court must rely on individuals to bring a case or 
controversy, Congress, in conjunction with the Department of 
Education, can constantly police violations and exact immediate 
corrective action. This ability, in turn, largely eliminates the 
sometimes-insurmountable issues of litigation costs and unequal 
access to the American court system. Because Congress and the 
Department of Education serve as constant watchdogs, they are able 
to intervene on behalf of many students who otherwise would 
probably be unable to vindicate their rights. 
3. Counterarguments.  This contention—that the protections 
students enjoy under NCLB are equivalent to the protections 
students would have enjoyed had Rodriguez formalized a right to 
education—faces two obvious counterarguments. 
First, one could highlight the fact that the Department of 
Education has not effectively enforced NCLB’s stringent 
requirements, despite its authorization to do so. Although countless 
schools have been restructured and restaffed pursuant to Department 
of Education mandates, the agency has yet to revoke completely any 
state’s federal funding, and numerous studies suggest that NCLB has 
not improved academic achievement markedly, if at all.263 This first 
 
 261. See, e.g., Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968) (instructing the school board 
to devise a plan that will provide “meaningful assurance of prompt and effective 
disestablishment of a dual system”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (ordering 
school districts to desegregate “with all deliberate speed”). 
 262. Lemos, supra note 259, at 1251–53; Sean Mulryne, Comment, A Tripartite Battle Royal: 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the Assertion of Separation-of-Powers Principles, 38 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 279, 317 (2008). 
 263. See generally ROBERT MANWARING, EDUC. SECTOR, RESTRUCTURING 
‘RESTRUCTURING’: IMPROVING INTERVENTIONS FOR LOW-PERFORMING SCHOOLS AND 
DISTRICTS (2010), available at http://www.educationsector.org/usr_doc/Restructuring.pdf 
(describing the corrective actions taken in states throughout the country pursuant to NCLB and 
charting by state the number of schools in restructuring); Regina Ramsey James, How To Mend 
a Broken Act: Recapturing Those Left Behind by No Child Left Behind, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 683 
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criticism, though sound, is not uniquely applicable to the 
congressionally created remedies available under NCLB. As 
discussed in Section C.2, because of various institutional-competence 
considerations, the courts are ill suited and ill equipped to compel 
state compliance in the realm of education.264 Moreover, were the 
judiciary to formalize a right to education, the catalogue of potential 
remedies the courts could make available to rectify violations would 
likely be identical to the remedies available under NCLB. One could 
put forward a compelling argument that these remedies are 
ineffective as means of improving academic achievement, but that 
argument would not be rebutted by appointing the courts to be the 
primary guardians of the right to education. Thus, although the 
proposition that the sanctions available under NCLB should be 
refined and employed more effectively is important—and almost 
certainly correct—the same proposition would hold true if those 
sanctions were instead available pursuant to a court’s holding. 
The second counterargument is far more persuasive and suggests 
a new goal around which education reformers might mobilize. 
Although NCLB implicitly preserves a liberty interest and establishes 
remedies to help protect that interest, the statute creates no private 
right of action. Thus, whereas a constitutional right to education 
would allow individuals to obtain judicial review and vindicate their 
rights through litigation,265 under NCLB, students are entirely 
dependent on Congress and the Department of Education to 
vindicate their rights and are left vulnerable if those two 
organizations opt not to act. 
In practice, the absence of a private right of action is not nearly 
so significant as it seems in theory. Because students are free to 
transfer out of any school that fails to provide an adequate and 
equitable education266 as that concept is defined by NCLB,267 students 
retain a key instrument for vindicating their rights. Moreover, 
although evidence suggests that the Department of Education’s 
 
(2010) (describing the ways in which NCLB has “fallen far short of its lofty expectations and 
objectives”). 
 264. See supra Part IV.C.2. 
 265. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a private right of action for individuals whose 
constitutional or statutory rights have been violated by an actor acting “under color of” state 
law); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–68 (1908) (affirming a federal right of action for 
equitable relief against government officials who have violated federal law). 
 266. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (2006). 
 267. See supra Part IV.B. 
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efforts to revolutionize schools in need of improvement have not yet 
been successful,268 the problem has not been agency inaction. A 
thorough analysis of the value of private rights of action, as compared 
to protection by the administrative state, falls outside the bounds of 
this Note. But, in all likelihood, the availability of a private right of 
action would not alter the list of schools that are already subject to 
sanctions under NCLB, nor would it alter the sanctions that are 
already in place at those schools. Nevertheless, lobbying Congress to 
establish a private right of action under NCLB is probably a more 
realistic strategy for education reformers than convincing the Court 
to recognize a constitutional right to education. If that strategy were 
successful, it would provide students with another powerful—and 
almost certainly more efficient—means of vindicating their rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The notion that the federal government has established an 
implicit, legislatively created right to education will undoubtedly—
and understandably—be met with some skepticism. The concept of an 
implicit, legislatively created right itself is novel, and some skeptics 
will argue that such a right cannot exist. Other skeptics will rightly 
argue that any advocate would prefer to bring a suit asserting a 
constitutional right to education rather than to rely on a right implied 
by legislation. Still others will highlight the flaws in NCLB that 
diminish the law’s effectiveness, thereby diminishing the quality of 
the right it confers. 
Each of these criticisms is warranted. The goal of this Note, 
however, is not to dispel all skepticism. This Note seeks simply to 
spark consideration of what the educational landscape would actually 
look like had the outcome of Rodriguez been different—namely, 
whether the scope of the federal government’s involvement in 
education would be even more expansive; whether the chasm 
between students in wealthy school districts and those in poor school 
districts would have narrowed; and whether it is possible that, even if 
a superior right to education theoretically exists, the implicit right the 
federal government has enshrined in NCLB is not actually so 
different from the judicially created right to education the plaintiffs in 
Rodriguez so desperately sought years ago. 
 
 268. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
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Admittedly, some of the provisions of NCLB need revision, and 
the Department of Education’s enforcement role could certainly be 
heightened and refined. Ultimately, however, the plaintiffs’ goal in 
the Rodriguez litigation was to ensure that no child in the Edgewood 
School District in San Antonio would be left behind. Nearly forty 
years later, the federal government has dedicated itself to achieving 
that goal, a transition that suggests that overruling Rodriguez at this 
point would actually have no cognizable effect. 
